Sweden was neutral for 210 years. Russia's invasion of Ukraine ended that in two years. Sweden joined NATO in March 2024, giving Russia 1,300 kilometres of new NATO border — the exact outcome it spent decades trying to prevent. So can Russia attack Sweden now? Here's the honest answer.
Sweden was neutral for 210 years. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine ended that in two years. Sweden joined NATO in March 2024, giving Russia 1,300 kilometres of new NATO border — the exact outcome it spent decades trying to prevent. So can Russia attack Sweden now? Here’s the honest answer.
When this article was first written in 2019, it asked a question that felt somewhat hypothetical: can Russia attack Sweden, and what would happen if it did? Sweden had been neutral for 200 years. The idea of it joining NATO — let alone Russia actively threatening Scandinavian countries — seemed distant enough to be theoretical.
Then Russia invaded Ukraine. And everything changed.
Sweden, which had maintained armed neutrality since 1814 — surviving both World Wars without taking sides — applied to join NATO in May 2022, weeks after Russian tanks rolled into Ukraine. After a 22-month ratification process blocked by Turkey and Hungary, Sweden officially became NATO’s 32nd member on 7 March 2024. Finland had joined a year earlier, in April 2023. At a stroke, Russia acquired over 1,300 kilometres of new NATO border — the exact outcome it had spent decades trying to prevent.
The question of whether Russia can attack Sweden is no longer theoretical. It is one of the most actively discussed security questions in European defence planning. And the answer — as it was in 2019, but for very different reasons — is still the same: it can, but it almost certainly will not. Here is why.
“Sweden was neutral for 210 years. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine ended that in two years. Moscow spent decades trying to keep NATO away from its borders. It got 1,300 kilometres of new NATO frontier instead.”
The History — 800 Years of Rivalry
Russia and Sweden are ancient rivals. Since the 12th century they have fought multiple wars over control of the Baltic Sea and the territories around it — including two major Russo-Swedish wars between 1741–43 and 1788–90. Sweden was, for a significant period of European history, a great power that controlled much of the Baltic coast. Russia under Peter the Great systematically dismantled Swedish dominance in the region.
Sweden’s neutrality began after the Napoleonic Wars. Having lost Finland to Russia in 1809 — a loss that permanently altered the country’s strategic outlook — Sweden under Karl Johan adopted a policy of armed neutrality that it maintained for over two centuries. Through two World Wars, the Cold War, and the post-Cold War period, Sweden stayed out of military alliances. It built a capable military, maintained close relationships with Western countries, and carefully avoided formal commitment to either side of global power rivalries.
That 210-year policy ended on 7 March 2024. The war in Ukraine convinced Sweden’s government and population that neutrality was no longer a viable security strategy in a Europe where Russia was willing to invade and occupy a neighbouring country.
Why Gotland Matters — The Strategic Key
To understand why Russia might ever consider military action involving Sweden, you have to understand Gotland. The island of Gotland sits in the middle of the Baltic Sea, roughly 90 kilometres from the Swedish mainland and strategically positioned relative to the Baltic states, Finland, Poland, and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.
Gotland is arguably the most strategically important piece of territory in the Baltic region. Whoever controls it controls the ability to project military power across the entire Baltic Sea. During the Cold War, Sweden maintained a substantial military garrison on Gotland. After the Cold War, as military budgets shrank and the threat seemed remote, Sweden drew down its presence significantly — a decision it has spent the past decade reversing.
Russia’s strategic interest in Gotland is not about Sweden per se — it is about NATO access to the Baltic Sea. In a conflict scenario, Russian control of Gotland would allow it to threaten NATO reinforcement routes to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland. Swedish NATO membership means Gotland is now a NATO asset, with Swedish and allied military forces present — exactly what Russia was trying to prevent.
“Gotland is not just a Swedish island. It is the strategic key to the Baltic Sea. Whoever holds it can threaten every naval and air route in the region. That is why Russia watches it so carefully — and why Sweden is remilitarising it.”
The Balance of Power — Russia vs Sweden
Head-to-head, Russia’s military is vastly larger than Sweden’s — more personnel, more equipment, far larger defence budget, and nuclear weapons. In a bilateral conflict, Russia would overwhelm Sweden. This has always been true and remains true in 2026. But the bilateral scenario is a fiction. The question has never been “can Russia defeat Sweden alone?” It has always been “what happens when Russia attacks a NATO member?”
The Article 5 Question — Why Russia Won’t Do It
NATO’s Article 5 is the foundation of the alliance: an attack on one member is an attack on all. When Sweden joined NATO in March 2024, it came under the Article 5 umbrella. A Russian military attack on Sweden would not be a Russia-Sweden conflict — it would be a Russia-NATO conflict, which means a conflict with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Poland, and 28 other countries simultaneously.
Russia understands this. The entire architecture of NATO was designed precisely to make this calculation obvious and unavoidable. No rational Russian military planner would recommend initiating a direct military confrontation with the NATO alliance, which possesses overwhelming conventional superiority and multiple independent nuclear arsenals. The deterrence is designed to be absolute.
This is why the original article’s conclusion — that a Russia-Sweden war is “very unlikely” — remains correct in 2026, even though the strategic situation has changed dramatically. If anything, Sweden’s NATO membership has made a direct military attack less likely, not more. Russia now has to calculate Article 5 into any action against Sweden. It could not afford to ignore it before; it certainly cannot now.
What Russia Can and Does Do — Below the Threshold
The fact that Russia will not launch a conventional military attack on Sweden does not mean it does nothing. Russia engages in a wide range of activities against Sweden and Nordic countries that fall below the threshold of military conflict — what military analysts call “grey zone” operations:
- GPS jamming. Russia has conducted systematic GPS jamming across the Baltic region, affecting aviation in Finland, Sweden, Estonia, and Latvia. Multiple civilian flights have reported navigation disruptions attributable to Russian electronic warfare systems operating from Kaliningrad and Russian territory.
- Air space violations. Russian military aircraft have repeatedly violated Swedish and Finnish airspace — including a Russian Su-24 bomber that violated Swedish airspace near Gotland in 2022, and a Russian drone that was found crashed in Sweden in 2024.
- Undersea cable sabotage. Multiple undersea data cables in the Baltic Sea have been severed in suspicious incidents. A Chinese vessel was implicated in the November 2024 cutting of cables connecting Estonia and Finland, in an incident suspected of involving coordination with Russia.
- Cyber operations. Swedish government agencies, political parties, and infrastructure have been targets of cyber operations attributed to Russian state actors.
- Disinformation. Sweden’s NATO membership application and accession was accompanied by significant Russian disinformation campaigns attempting to influence Swedish public opinion.
These activities constitute a form of ongoing conflict — just one conducted below the level at which Article 5 would be triggered. Russia’s strategy is to impose costs, sow uncertainty, and probe vulnerabilities without crossing the line that would bring NATO’s full response.
Scenarios — What Could Actually Happen
GPS jamming, cyber operations, airspace probing, and disinformation continue and potentially intensify. Sweden and NATO allies respond with defensive measures and diplomatic pressure. No military conflict.
A Russian submarine or aircraft incident near Gotland triggers a crisis — similar to the 2014 submarine search in Swedish waters. NATO allies respond with surveillance and diplomatic pressure. Heightened tension but no shooting war.
A major escalation of the Ukraine war or a separate NATO-Russia incident elsewhere draws Sweden into a broader conflict as a NATO member. Sweden’s military and bases become relevant to the broader war. This is the scenario Swedish defence planning now explicitly prepares for.
A conventional Russian military operation against Swedish territory — Gotland, airspace, or the mainland. Triggers Article 5. Means war with NATO. Requires Russia to believe the benefits outweigh a conflict with the entire Western alliance. No rational calculation supports this outcome while Russia is already losing in Ukraine.
Sweden’s Response — From Neutral to NATO
Sweden has not been passive in the face of these threats. The country has undertaken one of the most significant military buildups in its peacetime history since 2015:
- Defence spending has risen from 1% of GDP to above 2% — the NATO target — for the first time since the Cold War
- Conscription was reintroduced in 2017 after being suspended in 2010
- The garrison on Gotland was restored and significantly reinforced with air defence systems and ground forces
- Sweden has signed bilateral defence agreements with the UK, US, and other NATO allies, allowing allied forces to operate from Swedish territory
- The Gripen fighter fleet has been upgraded and integrated into NATO’s air policing missions
- Sweden’s Home Guard (Hemvärnet) has been expanded significantly
Can Russia attack Sweden? Militarily, yes. Russia has the capability to conduct military operations against Sweden. A conventional assault would overwhelm Swedish defences in a bilateral scenario.
Will Russia attack Sweden? Almost certainly not — for the same reason it has not attacked any other NATO member. Article 5 transforms any attack on Sweden into a war with the entire NATO alliance, including the United States. That is a war Russia cannot win and knows it cannot win. The deterrence calculation is as clear as it has ever been.
What Russia will do instead is continue grey zone operations — jamming, cyber attacks, probing, disinformation — at a level calculated to impose costs without triggering Article 5. This is the actual threat Sweden and its NATO allies are preparing for, and it requires a different kind of defence than conventional military deterrence alone.
The irony of Russia’s Ukraine war is complete. Moscow spent decades arguing that NATO expansion was an existential threat. Its invasion of Ukraine has produced exactly the expansion it feared most — two capable Nordic countries on its northern flank, with over 1,300 kilometres of new NATO border, and a Baltic Sea that is now effectively a NATO lake. Russia created the threat it claimed to be protecting against.