In 2019, space warfare was described as part of future conflict. Then Russia invaded Ukraine — and on Day 1, destroyed satellite communications across Europe in a cyber attack. Here's what the new space race actually looks like in 2026.
In 2019, space warfare was described as part of future conflict. Then Russia invaded Ukraine — and on Day 1, destroyed satellite communications across Europe in a cyber attack. Here’s what the new space race actually looks like in 2026.
When this article was first written in 2019, space warfare was described as something that was “very likely to be part of future warfare.” That framing aged badly, and quickly. In February 2022 — hours before Russian tanks crossed into Ukraine — Russian cyber operators took down tens of thousands of satellite modems across Central and Eastern Europe in a targeted attack on a commercial satellite network. Wind turbines went offline in Germany. Internet access disappeared across multiple countries. Ukrainian military communications were disrupted at the exact moment they needed them most.
Space warfare did not arrive in the future. It arrived on the first day of the war.
Six years later, the militarisation of space has accelerated faster than almost anyone predicted. There are over 14,000 active satellites in low-Earth orbit. Roughly two-thirds of them belong to Elon Musk’s Starlink — a civilian internet constellation that has become one of the most strategically significant military assets in the Ukraine conflict. Russia has tested anti-satellite weapons that created 1,500 pieces of trackable debris, threatening the International Space Station. NATO intelligence services believe Russia is developing a weapon that would flood Starlink’s orbits with clouds of shrapnel. And China is racing to build its own Starlink-like constellation partly because watching Starlink’s military performance in Ukraine made Beijing realise how exposed it would be in any future conflict without one.
Space is not a new battlefield. But in 2026, it is a very active one.
“Space warfare is not coming. It arrived on the first day of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — and nobody has been quite the same about satellites since.”
What Happened in Ukraine Changed Everything
The Ukraine war has been, among many other things, the world’s first major field test of satellite-enabled modern warfare — and the results have sent shockwaves through every military establishment on the planet.
Starlink terminals gave Ukrainian forces something no previous army in a defensive position had ever possessed: reliable, high-speed internet connectivity right up to the front line, resistant to the kind of infrastructure destruction that Russia was systematically inflicting. Ukrainian drone operators used Starlink to live-stream feeds. Artillery units used it for targeting. Command structures used it for communications when traditional infrastructure was destroyed. The technology that Elon Musk launched as a broadband internet service became a battlefield utility as significant as GPS.
Russia responded by trying to kill it. Russian electronic warfare units have conducted daily GPS jamming and spoofing across the conflict zone and the broader Baltic region. Attempts were made to hack and disable Starlink terminals. Russian officials explicitly declared that commercial satellites supporting Ukraine’s military could be “legitimate targets.” In November 2022, Russia deployed the S-500 ground-based missile system, which it claims can engage targets in low Earth orbit.
And in December 2025, NATO intelligence services revealed that Russia may be developing a far more alarming capability: a “zone-effect” weapon that would flood Starlink’s orbital lanes with hundreds of thousands of high-density millimetre-sized pellets, potentially disabling multiple satellites simultaneously. Unlike a kinetic anti-satellite missile that destroys one target, this weapon would create a debris field affecting everything in those orbits — including Russia’s own satellites and China’s Tiangong Space Station.
Whether Russia would actually deploy such a weapon is doubtful — the self-destructive collateral damage would be immense. But the fact that it is apparently being developed tells you everything about how seriously Moscow takes the threat that space-based systems pose to its military operations.
“Of the 14,000 active satellites in low-Earth orbit, roughly two-thirds are Starlink. Control of orbital infrastructure has become as strategically important as control of the seas.”
The Countries in the Race — Where Things Stand
The US Space Force, established in 2019, is now a full branch of the military with dedicated personnel, budget, and doctrine. The US leads in satellite numbers, orbital intelligence, and the commercial infrastructure (Starlink, Planet Labs, BlackSky) that has become militarily indispensable. The US has ASAT capability but has imposed a unilateral moratorium on destructive testing following Russia’s 2021 debris-generating test.
China had nearly 1,200 satellites in orbit as of July 2025 and is building its own Starlink-equivalent constellation — partly driven by watching Starlink’s military utility in Ukraine. China has demonstrated ASAT capability, developed jamming and laser-dazzling systems, and is actively testing orbital maneuvering capabilities. Two Chinese entities began launching their broadband LEO constellations in 2025.
Russia conducted a destructive ASAT test in November 2021, destroying a Soviet-era satellite and creating 1,500 pieces of trackable debris — forcing ISS crew to take emergency shelter. Russia has active jamming, cyber, and directed-energy capabilities. But its commercial space sector has collapsed under sanctions, and its satellite constellation is aging. Russia’s space warfare capability is real but increasingly asymmetric.
India tested ASAT capability in 2019. France launched its Space Command with a declared defensive space weapons programme. Israel has alleged ASAT capability. The UK established its Space Command in 2021. The proliferation of space military capability to second-tier powers is accelerating — the club of countries with meaningful counter-space tools is growing fast.
The Kessler Syndrome — The Nightmare Scenario
Any discussion of space warfare eventually arrives at the same terrifying concept: Kessler Syndrome. Named after NASA scientist Donald Kessler, who described it in 1978, it refers to a cascade scenario in which space debris in low-Earth orbit reaches a density where collisions between objects generate more debris, which causes more collisions, which generates more debris — a self-sustaining chain reaction that could render entire orbital bands unusable for generations.
Russia’s 2021 ASAT test created a debris field at roughly 480 kilometres altitude — the same altitude as the International Space Station. The ISS crew had to shelter in escape capsules. The debris will remain in orbit for years, gradually decaying but continuously posing collision risks to every satellite in that band.
A large-scale anti-satellite attack — whether Russia’s hypothetical shrapnel cloud or a more conventional series of ASAT strikes — could trigger exactly this cascade. The irony is total: destroying the satellites that your enemy depends on would also destroy the satellites you depend on, and potentially make the entire orbital infrastructure of modern civilisation unusable. GPS, weather forecasting, financial transaction routing, telecommunications, military communications — all of it runs through satellites. A Kessler cascade doesn’t just affect military operations. It affects everything.
This is why most space security analysts are sceptical that any major space power would actually conduct large-scale destructive attacks on satellites — the mutually assured destruction logic is just as powerful in orbit as it was for nuclear weapons during the Cold War. But the testing, the development, and the implicit threats continue. The weapons are being built even if nobody intends to use them.
The Outer Space Treaty — and Why Nobody Cares
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 established the basic legal framework for space — banning weapons of mass destruction in orbit, prohibiting national appropriation of celestial bodies, and declaring space the “province of all mankind.” It has been signed by 114 countries including the US, Russia, and China.
It has also been comprehensively ignored whenever convenient. The treaty does not prohibit conventional weapons in space, does not restrict anti-satellite capabilities, and has no enforcement mechanism whatsoever. Russia’s 2021 ASAT test violated no treaty provision. China’s jamming and orbital maneuvering programmes violate no treaty provision. The Outer Space Treaty is, functionally, a statement of aspirations rather than a binding constraint on behaviour.
Various attempts have been made to negotiate additional agreements — a treaty banning weapons in space, a code of conduct for responsible space behaviour, UN General Assembly resolutions against ASAT testing. None have achieved meaningful buy-in from the major space powers simultaneously. The US and Russia can’t agree. Russia and China can agree on some things but not the things that constrain their own capabilities. The result is the same regulatory vacuum that exists in cyberspace: a domain of enormous strategic importance governed by almost nothing.
What Comes Next
The militarisation of space is not reversing. It is accelerating. Several developments to watch in 2026 and beyond:
The commercial-military boundary is dissolving. Starlink is the clearest example, but it is not the only one. Satellite imagery companies, communications providers, and positioning services that are nominally civilian are deeply integrated into military operations. This creates a grey area in international law — are commercial satellites legitimate military targets? Russia says yes. The US says no. Nobody has a definitive answer.
China’s constellation build-out. China’s Guowang and Qianfan LEO constellations are moving from planning to launch. When complete, they will give China space-based communications infrastructure that is not dependent on Western-controlled satellites and not vulnerable to the kind of access restrictions that Starlink has occasionally imposed on Ukraine. Every authoritarian government has taken note.
Orbital maneuvering as a weapon. Beyond jamming and direct ASAT missiles, a quieter and more sophisticated form of space warfare is developing: satellites that can maneuver close to other satellites, inspect them, interfere with them, or potentially disable them without creating observable debris. This “proximity operations” capability is being developed by the US, China, and Russia — and it may be even more destabilising than kinetic weapons, because it is harder to attribute and harder to deter.
The Space Race of the 1960s was about national prestige. The space competition of the 2020s is about military advantage, economic infrastructure, and the control of orbits that the entire modern world depends on. We are not watching a race to plant a flag on the Moon. We are watching a race to control the roads that everything — GPS, weather, finance, communications, warfare — travels on.
Sources include CSIS Aerospace Security Program, the Associated Press, PBS NewsHour, Space.com, Gizmodo, and the Secure World Foundation’s annual Space Threat Assessment. All developments described are based on public reporting as of June 2026.